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WHO OWNS A CLASS ACTION?
RICHARD A. BOOTH*

I

s the plaintiff in a class action the master of his complaint? That is the
question now before the Supreme Court. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.
Knowles,1 the respondent suffered hail damage to his house.2 His insurance
company paid for the cost of repairs but not for the standard twenty percent
markup charged by his contractor. Knowles sued in state court—one known to
be friendly to class actions—for himself and for similarly situated Arkansas
homeowners.3 But to avoid being removed to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Knowles limited the damages he sought to less
than $5 million by defining the class to include only homeowners who had
similar claims arising in the previous two years—even though the statute of
limitations permitted claims as old as five years.4
Although the ultimate question in Knowles is whether the plaintiff class
may be gerrymandered so as to avoid removal to federal court, a closely related
question may arise in securities fraud class actions (which are filed in federal
court in the first place). In an action under SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff
typically seeks to recover for losses suffered as a result of buying a stock at a
price inflated by management misrepresentations. In such a case, the measure
of damages is the difference between the price paid and the price at which the
stock settles after corrective disclosure.5
Although this remedy is well-established, it is fundamentally flawed in that
it includes losses suffered by the corporation itself that should be the subject of
a derivative action.6 Specifically, the decrease in price may come from several
different sources: (1) lower expected return, (2) an increase in the cost of
capital, or (3) enforcement and litigation expenses.7 An increase in the cost of
capital may or may not be actionable, depending on the whether it comes from
(a) increased firm-specific business risk, (b) increased industry risk, or (c) a loss
of trust in management (reputational loss).8 The portion of the loss that comes
*
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Law.
1. 133 S. Ct. 90 (2012).
2. See Knowles v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:11-CV-04044, 2011 WL 6013024, at
*1 (W.D. Ark. 2011 Dec. 2, 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 90 (2012).
3. See id. at *2.
4. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
5. See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011)
(discussing distinction between transaction causation, or price impact, and loss causation).
6. See Richard A. Booth, Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation, 64 S.C. L. REV.
265 (2012).
7. See id. at 272.
8. See id.; see also Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J.
CORP. L. 169 (2009). But see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement
for Rule 10b-5 Causes-of-Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
63 BUS. LAW. 163 (2007); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5
Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 29–30 (1994)
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from items (3) and (c) are clearly derivative in nature and affect all
stockholders, including both buyers and holders.9 But in a Rule 10b-5 class
action only buyers have standing to sue.10 Moreover, because the corporation
ultimately pays any settlement in a class action, portfolio investors—such as
mutual funds—who may have bought some shares during the fraud period but
who hold even more shares that were purchased before the fraud period, often
lose more as a result of settlement than they recover in the class action.11 These
investors would, or should, prefer a derivative action in which the corporation
recovers from the individual wrongdoers.12
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to protect absent class members
by requiring the court to certify that an action is appropriate for class action
status before it may proceed as such.13 Among other things, the court must find
that the plaintiff is an adequate representative for the class and, in cases seeking
damages for individual class members, that a class action is superior to other
ways of litigating the case.14
Clearly, an undiversified stock-picking investor cannot be an adequate
representative for diversified portfolio investors who would prefer that the
action be dropped altogether. The Supreme Court decided that issue in 1940 in
Hansberry v. Lee15 where the plaintiff homeowner sought a declaration as to
the validity of a racially restrictive covenant over the objection of a would-be
seller.16 Neither does it help for objecting investors to opt out since by doing so
they will forgo their share of the remedy but will still be taxed, in effect, as
holders for the benefit of buyers.
The courts should decline to certify most Rule 10b-5 actions as class
actions because the plaintiff class invariably includes diversified portfolio
investors—buyer-holders, who will lose more on the shares they hold because
of the class action itself than they will gain on the shares they bought during the
fraud period.17 Moreover, such investors are quite indifferent to a class action
remedy anyway because over time they are just as likely to sell a fraud-affected
stock as to buy one.18 But Knowles suggests that a plaintiff can define the class
so as to exclude investors who might object. To be sure, it is not clear how a
(arguing that there should be no recovery for consequential damages in connection with
securities fraud claims).
9. See Booth, supra note 6, at 273–74.
10. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975); see
also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82–85 (2006)
(construing Standard Litigation Uniform Standards Act connection requirement independently
of judicially imposed standing requirement).
11. See Booth, supra note 6, at 287–91.
12. See id. at 294–95.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
15. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
16. See id. at 37–39.
17. See Booth, supra note 6, at 303–05.
18. See Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 701, 702 (2012).
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court could ascertain precisely who is a member of a class so defined, which
would preclude certification.19 But even if it is possible to determine who
belongs in the class, the question remains whether it is permissible to
gerrymander the class in order for the action to be certified as a class action.
To be sure, the courts have held that the plaintiff is the master of his
complaint.20 But there are limits to this metaphor, which emanates from a 1938
case that did not involve a class claim. In contrast, a class plaintiff cannot drop
the case or settle it without the approval of the court.21 Moreover, the attorney
for the plaintiff class is paid out of the recovery pot if the case succeeds—but
only to the extent that the court deems fair.22 And in a securities fraud class
action, the court must determine who should serve as the lead plaintiff under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).23 Clearly, absent
class members have rights.
In a case like Knowles, an excluded class member can always start his own
class action—assuming that he knows he has been excluded. But what if the
first action bankrupts the defendant or the class is defined so as to deplete
available insurance and to split the pot among the fewest possible claimants?
And whatever happened to judicial economy? Although litigants are generally
free to frame their claims however they want, they are not free to hog the
judiciary to the exclusion of others. There is a public interest inherent in the use
of the judicial system. If there are multiple claims that are essentially identical,
the courts have the power to consolidate them in the interest of resolving as
many disputes as possible.24 Indeed, the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 effectively requires the consolidation of related actions
involving fifty or more plaintiffs.25
Moreover, in a securities fraud class action that subsumes derivative
claims—as any meritorious action does—the plaintiff is a fiduciary for his
fellow stockholders.26 He cannot convert a derivative claim into a class claim
simply because he would like to recover individually rather than for the
corporation—let alone gerrymander the class to exclude inconvenient class

19. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
that Supreme Court has been silent on what showing plaintiffs must make in support of
motion for class certification).
20. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (“If [a
plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal court, he may resort to the expedient of
suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more,
the defendant cannot remove.”).
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787–
88 (Del. 1981) (holding court retains power to approve or disapprove settlement or dismissal
of derivative action).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
23. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(g) (certifying court must appoint class counsel).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
25. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
26. See, e.g., Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 186–88 (Ct. App. 1985).
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members.27 As the late Judge Robert Bork observed in Cowin v. Bresler,28 to
permit individual recovery on such claims is to divert an asset of the corporation
to the plaintiff stockholder to the exclusion of other stockholders.29 The
principle applies a fortiori where the class claim would be paid by the
corporation as in a securities fraud class action. In any event, it is for the
court—not the plaintiff—to decide whether a claim is direct or derivative.30
Ironically, a derivative action is a type of class action. It is a class action
by the stockholders who seek an injunction compelling the corporation to sue
those who have done it wrong—so to speak—usually the directors and
officers.31 Because the rules require that a class claim for damages be superior
to other means of resolving the dispute, it would seem that the rules require that
if a claim can be handled as a derivative action, it must be so handled.32
To be clear, the approach advocated here would likely mean the end of the
securities fraud class action as we know it.33 But that would be a good thing.34
Most legal scholars agree that class actions do little to compensate investors.
Since the defendant company (or its insurer) pays, the remedy is ultimately
circular—holders pay buyers. But most seem also to agree that class actions are
an important source of deterrence.35 As for compensation, diversified investors
need no compensation for trading losses. Because a diversified investor is
27. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del.
2004).
28. 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29. See id. at 414; see also Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2005);
cf. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 712–13
(1974).
30. Incidentally, it has become common for large stockholders to opt out of securities
fraud class actions to pursue their claims individually, possibly to avoid the special
requirements imposed by PSLRA or (more likely) to negotiate for a more generous settlement
that need not be shared with the class. Cf. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc.,
660 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012) (representing that
plaintiff would pursue its claim individually if class is not certified). Although some have
suggested that this demonstrates the good faith of securities fraud plaintiffs and indeed the
need for a remedy, the argument here shows that such tactics are more properly viewed as
abusive. Once it is recognized that the genuine harm to investors is derivative rather than
direct, presumably the courts will have no problem dealing with individual claims
appropriately.
31. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541–42 (1970).
32. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2565–66 (2011).
33. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know
It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2007). Thanks to REM.
34. Thanks to Martha Stewart.
35. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 103–118 (2011); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil
Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297
(2009); Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237
(2009); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301 (2008); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Jill E. Fisch,
Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333,
336–38 (2009).
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equally likely to sell an overvalued stock as to buy one, such losses come out in
the wash. The only genuine losses—from the cost of litigation and increases in
the cost of capital—are derivative losses suffered by all of the stockholders.
Thus, securities fraud class actions constitute excessive deterrence in that they
offer a windfall to investors, who are thus induced to sue too often. Although
one might argue that there is no such thing as over-deterrence when it comes to
fraud, the downside is that managers are reluctant to speak as freely as they
might otherwise do and that investors are left with less information than they
might otherwise enjoy. Moreover, fraud is a bit of a misnomer in the typical
Rule 10b-5 class action, because neither the corporation nor the individual
defendants, if any, gain from the offense. In contrast, a derivative action is
perfectly tailored to the genuine harm from securities fraud. And a derivative
action is a more potent deterrent in that the individual wrongdoers pay.
In short, there is much more at stake in Knowles than may appear at first
blush. And judging by the number of class action cases it has taken recently,
the Court seems to be particularly keen on making sense out of the law relating
thereto. Knowles is an ideal opportunity for the Court to make it clear that a
class action is a matter of judicial grace, and that as such, the courts have the
power and the duty to assure that the device is used efficiently and equitably.
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